Combat air support for guerrilla operations. Guerrilla operation "Rail War" Dictionary of historical concepts

The General Staff of the Red Army began planning an offensive operation to liberate Belarus in early April 1944. On May 20, General A. Antonov presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief a plan that provided for the simultaneous breakthrough of enemy defenses in six sectors, the dismemberment of enemy troops and their defeat in parts. Particular importance was attached to the elimination of the most powerful flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the rapid advance to Minsk, as well as the encirclement and destruction of the main forces of Army Group Center east of Minsk at a depth of 200-300 km.

Troops from four fronts were involved in Operation Bagration. The 1st Baltic Front (commander General I. Bagramyan) advanced from the area north-west of Vitebsk, the 3rd Belorussian Front (commander General I. Chernyakhovsky) - south of Vitebsk towards Borisov. The 2nd Belorussian Front (commander General G. Zakharov) operated in the Mogilev direction. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (commanded by General K. Rokossovsky) were aimed at Bobruisk and Minsk.

To coordinate the actions of the fronts, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief allocated its representatives. Thus, the offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts was coordinated by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A. Vasilevsky, and the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts were coordinated by the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal G. Zhukov.

In Operation Bagration, an important role was played by Belarusian partisans. By the summer of 1944, 143 thousand partisans were operating on Belarusian soil, part of 150 partisan brigades and 49 separate detachments. The Supreme High Command assigned specific tasks to the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement: to disrupt communications behind enemy lines, destroy German headquarters, disable enemy equipment, conduct reconnaissance in the interests of advancing fronts, capture and hold advantageous positions and bridgeheads on rivers until the army approaches, provide support to military units during the liberation of cities, railway junctions and stations, organize the protection of populated areas, disrupt the export of Soviet citizens to Germany, and in every possible way prevent the Nazis from destroying industrial enterprises and bridges during the retreat.

Thus, before the start of the Belarusian operation, partisan brigades and detachments of Polesie, the southern part of Minsk, Pinsk, Baranovichi, Brest and other regions, operating in the offensive zone of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, had to capture and hold crossings until the approach of Soviet troops, and organize thorough reconnaissance transmit information about the enemy to the advancing units, meet the front troops, show them crossings and provide them with guides, make it difficult for the enemy to regroup troops, and disrupt the transportation of goods by rail.

Since mid-May, commands and headquarters, all the soldiers and partisans involved in the liberation of Belarus, began preparations for the offensive. By the beginning of the operation, 2,400 thousand people, 5,200 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated on four fronts. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in men by 2 times, in tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns - by 5.8 times, in guns and mortars - by 3.8 times, in combat aircraft - by 3.9 times.

The interaction of partisan formations with the advancing Soviet regular troops became widespread. It was the closest and most effective during the Belarusian operation. During this offensive, the partisans provided significant assistance to units and formations. The Zheleznyak partisan brigade, operating under the command of A.V. Sklyarenko in the eastern part of the Minsk region, on June 27 reached the Berezina River, captured the crossing and, repelling repeated attempts by retreating German units to break through it, held the bridgehead until the approach of the 35th Tank Brigade of General A.A. Aslanova. The tankers, in cooperation with the partisan brigade, completely defeated the enemy, successfully transported the tanks across two bridges built by the partisans to the opposite bank of the river and continued the offensive, in which the Zheleznyakovites participated as guides.

Each partisan brigade drew up a plan for reconnaissance of enemy forces, areas of action and specific military installations. Brigades and detachments were a reliable base for army intelligence and its groups. Army groups used both partisan intelligence forces and its information about the enemy to carry out their tasks. Many formations and brigades placed their reconnaissance units, individual scouts and guides at the disposal of the army command.

During the period of close operational-tactical interaction between the partisans and units of the Red Army, the number of captures of soldiers and especially Wehrmacht officers, operational documents, samples increased sharply military equipment, personal documents of the Nazis. With the help of “tongues” they obtained valuable information not only for tactical, operational, but sometimes also strategic purposes. In almost all brigades, Komsomol youth groups were created to capture the enemy’s “languages” and documents.

The partisans' intelligence information about enemy communications was of great value to the command of the Red Army. The reconnaissance work was organized in such a way that control over the transportation or advancement of enemy columns was carried out sequentially in the zone of each partisan formation. Front headquarters were repeatedly informed about the concentration of Wehrmacht military echelons at railway stations. This helped Soviet aviation to carry out bombing and assault strikes on them with great accuracy. Thanks to continuous observation of enemy transportation along railways and highways, partisan reconnaissance officers and underground fighters also identified places where enemy military equipment was concentrated and directed our bomber aircraft to targets.

The largest operation of the partisans was the 3rd stage of the “rail war,” which began three days before the Soviet troops went on the offensive. On the night of June 20, 1944, partisans of the Mogilev unit attacked the important Vitebsk-Orsha-Mogilev railway line, captured it in battle, destroyed 40 kilometers of railway track, blew up 5,000 rails and 2 railway bridges. The destruction was so significant that the Nazis were never able to restore the line before the arrival of our troops. The 10 trains remaining on the routes became trophies of the Red Army.

Partisan brigades and detachments of the Mogilev and Minsk regions controlled many sections of the Mogilev-Minsk, Mogilev-Bobruisk, Orsha-Minsk highways, a dense network of improved roads between the Dnieper and Druti, Druti and Berezina rivers, in the Borisov-Osipovichi-Minsk triangle. In these areas, they steadfastly held the zones through which Hitler’s troops tried to break through.

The partisans of the Mogilev formation alone, during the period of expulsion of the Nazis from the territory of the region, destroyed more than 2,000 and captured up to 4,000 fascist soldiers and officers, capturing many trophies.

The participation of the region's partisans in the Belarusian offensive operation was a fact of great operational and strategic significance. The enormous combat experience accumulated over three years of fighting behind enemy lines was fully used to assist the Red Army. The command of the 1st Belorussian Front noted in one of its documents: “The Military Council of the Front expresses its gratitude to the fearless avenger fighters, the Belarusian partisans, who victoriously completed their difficult path of struggle against the fascist invaders.”

Never before has the national struggle acquired such a powerful scope as during the Belarusian offensive operation, and never before have the blows of partisan formations been struck against the enemy with such force as in those days.

As a result of the defeat of large enemy forces near Vitebsk, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Minsk, the immediate goal of Operation Bagration was achieved, several days earlier than planned. In 12 days - from June 23 to July 4 - Soviet troops advanced almost 250 km. Vitebsk, Mogilev, Polotsk, Minsk and Bobruisk regions were completely liberated.

The whole of Belarus took part in Operation Bagration. When crossing the Western Dvina by the training battalion of the 167th Guards Rifle Division, the peasants of the village of Bui, Beshenkovichi district, not only indicated the most convenient places for crossing, but also transported the soldiers on boats and rafts. And such examples are countless. An 80-year-old peasant from the village of Novaya Dubrova, Oktyabrsky district, V. Kolenkevich undertook to lead Soviet companies to the river through the forest and swamp. The appearance of soldiers on the banks of the river was so unexpected for the Germans that they were forced to flee without having time to blow up the bridge. More than once, A. Ermolenko, a resident of the village of Bechi, Zhitkovichi district, led scouts and soldiers of the Red Army through thickets and swamps to the rear of the invaders. For courage in battle, for resourcefulness and assistance provided, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

The losses of four Soviet fronts during the entire Operation Bagration in killed, wounded, and missing reached 765,815 people (48% of the total by June 23, 1944). Of the total losses, 178,507 people were killed. From June 23 to the end of July, that is, during the battles to liberate Belarus, Soviet troops lost 440,879 people (29.8% of personnel), including 97,232 people killed (6.6%). During the war years, including Operation Bagration, almost 26 thousand Belarusian partisans died the death of the brave directly in battles with the Nazi invaders, of which 11,797 were missing. The Motherland saluted 36 times to commemorate the military successes of the armies and partisan formations of four fronts. 662 military units and formations that most distinguished themselves during the liberation of Belarus were given honorary names of Belarusian cities and rivers.

For courage and bravery shown in battles with the Nazi invaders in June - August 1944, more than 500 thousand army soldiers and partisans were awarded orders and medals, over 1500 became Heroes Soviet Union. In total, since 1941, the exploits of 140 thousand Belarusian partisans have been awarded orders and medals, the most distinguished being awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The famous Belarusian operation of 1944 was one of the most powerful in World War II in its scope and military-political results. The Byelorussian SSR and parts of the Lithuanian and Latvian SSR were liberated. The Red Army entered the territory of Poland and advanced to the borders of East Prussia.

Partisan formations played an extremely important role in the liberation of Belarus. Solving problems in close cooperation with the troops of the Red Army, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The Motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 27 who especially distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union. On August 15, the leaders of the partisan movement in Belarus - P.K. Ponomarenko, P.Z. Kalinin, V.E. Lobanok and V.E. Chernyshev were awarded the General Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, V.T. Merkul, D.V. Tyabut, A.A. Prokhorov - Order of Kutuzov, 1st degree. Hundreds of partisans were awarded the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, Patriotic War, Suvorov and Kutuzov II degree, Red Star.

But the victory came at a high price. The losses were excessive; justice requires this to be acknowledged. During the offensive, the troops of four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is 48.8% of their total strength at the beginning of the operation. Irreversible losses amounted to 178,507 people. From June 23 to August 29, the fronts lost 2,957 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,447 guns and mortars, 822 combat aircraft and 183.5 thousand small arms. The troops suffered especially great damage in personnel and military equipment in the first days of the operation - when breaking through the defenses and crossing the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, as well as at the final stage of the offensive - when crossing the Vistula, Neman, Narev rivers, when repelling enemy counterattacks in the Baltic states, in the areas of Mangusheva and Pulawy. From June 23 to the end of July, when the struggle for the liberation of Belarus was underway, Soviet troops lost 440,879 people, including 97,232 killed.

Such losses in personnel were explained by the stubborn resistance of the enemy, the power of his defense, the difficulties of crossing many rivers, ineffective artillery and aviation preparation, the unsatisfactory actions of the 5th Guards Tank Army, and poor interaction of troops with aviation and partisans. They were also due to shortcomings in the combat training of soldiers drafted into the active army during the operation itself. Thus, former partisans, underground fighters, and these were mostly young people of military age, after the liberation of the territory of the republic, immediately joined the units and formations of the Red Army; often hastily, on the move, without proper military training, they were thrown into battle. Showing courage and bravery, they nevertheless did not possess tactical skill, which is why there were unjustifiably large losses among them, for which the command was also to blame.

PREPARATION OF THE OPERATION

For two years, the peoples of the Soviet Union have been waging the Great Patriotic War against the German invaders who treacherously invaded the territory of our country. In the rear of the German fascist hordes that temporarily captured Belarus, the partisan struggle of the Belarusian people flared up with unprecedented ferocity and tenacity to crush the Hitlerite military machine and exterminate the criminal army of interventionists by all means available to the people. Partisans and partisans inflict especially serious blows on the communications of the German army, wreck military trains with troops, equipment, ammunition, fuel and weapons, military property, blow up railway bridges, blow up or burn station buildings, blow up and burn, shoot locomotives, wagons, tanks at stations and sidings, dismantling rails on railways. With their combat actions, partisans and partisans destroy the enemy’s rear, exhaust the enemy, and inflict enormous damage on him in manpower and equipment. Many hundreds of military echelons do not reach the front, they fly downhill at the hands of the partisan avengers.

The railways passing through Belarus, along their entire length, are under the continuous influence of partisan detachments and sabotage groups, which is of enormous importance in disrupting the operational and strategic plans of the enemy. At the same time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus believes that the combat work of the Belarusian partisans to destroy the enemy’s supply routes can and should be strengthened, for this there are all the prerequisites and possibilities. The most important of these conditions are: the widespread rapid development of the partisan movement itself, taking on the character of a nationwide movement against the occupiers, the presence of a wide communications network, airfields and landing sites for aircraft, the controllability of all partisan detachments and brigades in the occupied regions and regions of Belarus, the presence of regional workers working on the spot and regional underground committees of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus.

All these favorable conditions and the enormous strength of the movement itself make it possible at the moment to set before the partisan movement in Belarus the task of delivering massive attacks on the enemy’s railway communications in order to radically disorganize the entire railway network passing through the territory of Belarus.

This task can be successfully solved by the Belarusian partisans not only by organizing the crash of military trains, exploding bridges, railway stations, disabling steam locomotives and carriages, but also in other ways. Proposals submitted on this issue to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus, based on the study of two years of experience in partisan warfare behind enemy lines, show that radical disorganization of the enemy’s railway communications can be achieved by massive destruction of railway tracks.

Using the “rail war” method, the destruction of communications can be brought to a catastrophic level for the Nazi troops. With the massive use of this method of fighting, the enemy will be forced to carry out enormous labor-intensive work to replace blown up rails to restore the tracks. It will be necessary to deliver a colossal amount of steel and rolled products, which will be an almost impossible task for him.

Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus

decides:

1. To approve, submitted to the Central Committee for consideration, developed on the initiative of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus, Comrade Ponomarenko, the plan for deploying a partisan “rail war” in the rear of the German occupiers as the most effective way massive destruction of enemy railway communications.

2. The Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus calls on all partisans and partisans, commanders and commissars of detachments and brigades, leaders of sabotage groups to strengthen continuous fighting to destroy the enemy's railway communications, to use the favorable opportunities of the summer period to deliver the strongest massive blows to the Hitlerite military machine in the places most vulnerable to it. The radical disorganization of the enemy's railway communications will constitute the historical merit of the Belarusian partisans and partisans in the Great Patriotic War Soviet people against the Nazi invaders.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P. Ponomarenko

Resolution of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus “On the destruction of enemy railway communications using the method of “rail war” dated June 24, 1943 // Organs state security USSR in the Great Patriotic War. T. 4. Part 1. No. 1482

“RAIL WAR”: SUCCESS OF THE SOVIET COMMAND?

Hero of the Soviet Union, commander of the partisan unit, Colonel Roman Naumovich Machulsky, in his memoirs, indicates that “... The Shturmovaya, People's Avengers, Zheleznyak brigades, detachments of the Begoml-Borisov zone and the M. V. Frunze brigade of the Vileika region for the period from 15 August to November 1, 1943, over 2.5 thousand rails were destroyed on the Molodechno-Minsk section. During this time, the brigades “Death to Fascism”, “Uncle Kolya”, “For Soviet Belarus”, them. N. A. Shchorsa, named after. The Pravda newspapers, operating on the Minsk-Borisov-Orsha section, broke over 8 thousand rails. Partisans of the brigade named after. V.P. Chkalov, Baranovichi region, derailed 21 enemy trains in 15 days, destroyed more than 1,300 Nazis, broke 272 rails, blew up and burned 8 cars and 10 bridges.

On November 10 - 30, the troops of the Belorussian Front conducted the Gomel-Rechitsa operation. During this operation, the partisans paralyzed traffic on the railways Minsk - Gomel, Brest - Luninets - Gomel, Orsha - Zhlobin and, with attacks on highways in these areas, disrupted the regrouping and combat support of enemy troops, prevented their transfer to the breakthrough sites and thereby contributed to success advancing Red Army troops.

“RAIL WAR” IN BELARUS 1943

Evidence of the effectiveness of the partisan attacks is that when the enemy attempted to stop the Red Army’s offensive in the Mogilev direction and on December 12, 1943, sent the 292nd Infantry Division from the Bykhov area to the Parichi area, it arrived at its destination only on December 30, and therefore , was unable to play her intended role in the counterattack.

The effectiveness of the partisans’ actions in the southeastern regions of Belarus is also confirmed by General Kurt von Tippelskirch, at that time the commander of the 12th Army Corps of Army Group Center: “The 2nd German Army,” he wrote, “starting from September 27, unsuccessfully tried to pull up sufficient quantity forces with the aim of striking in a southern direction, to restore contact with Army Group “South” between Pripyat and the Dnieper. The sparse and therefore extremely overloaded railway network, the capacity of which, already insignificant in the area of ​​the Pripyat swamps, was further reduced as a result of the fierce activity of the partisans, could hardly provide the supply of everything necessary for this army. The transfer of allocated forces was carried out at a snail’s pace, which constantly strained the nerves of the command and forced him to constantly postpone the dates of the planned offensive, although carrying out the latter became more and more difficult every day.”

According to data from the German Directorate of Railways "Minsk", as a result of the actions of the partisans, movement to railway tracks in September 1943, it was interrupted for more than 265 days, and on double-track sections it was carried out on one track for 112 days.

As a result of the first two stages of the “Rail War,” operational transportation of the enemy during intense fighting at the front through the territory of Belarus was reduced by 40%, which contributed to the success of the offensive operations of the Red Army and prevented the organization of a systematic withdrawal of German troops and the export of loot to Germany.

Operations “Rail War” and “Concert” were distinguished by a number of characteristic features. If before the summer of 1943, partisan combat operations on the railways were reduced mainly to the activities of individual sabotage groups, now almost the entire personnel of detachments and formations, and even members of reserve groups, were involved in their conduct.

Both brilliantly carried out operations entered the annals of the Great Patriotic War as large, massive partisan attacks on railway communications, carried out within a time frame agreed with the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and had important operational and strategic significance. In terms of their scale and significance, these operations were a new phenomenon in the history of wars and the partisan movement. Never before has there been such close interaction between the partisan movement and the army. Never before has the struggle of the people's avengers behind enemy lines played such a role in achieving success on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

A.S. Rusak, A.V. Galinskaya, N.D. Shevchenko. “Rail War” in Belarus, 1943

“RAIL WAR”: A TACTICAL MISTAKE?

In order 0042 dated July 14, 1943, the TsShPD ordered: “rails should be broken on the main highways, spare, access, auxiliary, depot tracks, and spare rails should be destroyed...”

The TsShPD mistakenly believed that the enemy lacked rails. Blowing up the rails therefore seemed very tempting, simple and in an accessible way struggle. But the enemy had a surplus of rails, the Germans welded them at night and replaced them during the day, and then they came up with an 80-centimeter circuit bridge and began to pass trains along it: after all, when a 200-gram bomb exploded, only 25-40 cm of rail was knocked out.

In 1943, two “rail war” operations took place. The first began on the night of July 22 by Bryansk partisans, and the general multi-day war began on the night of August 3 and lasted until September 16. The second operation, called the "concert", began on September 16 and continued until December 1. The planned “winter concert” did not take place due to a lack of explosives among the partisans.

All this did not give the desired results. Traffic on the railways was completely blocked only in the rear of Army Group Center, and even then only for three days, from August 3 to 6. Moreover, switching the main efforts of the partisans to blowing up the rails with a lack of explosives led to a reduction in train crashes, and ultimately contributed to an increase in road capacity, but at the same time made it difficult for our military railroad workers to restore the railways during the offensive.

Here are the numbers. About 100 thousand partisans took part in the first operation. 214,705 rails were blown up, including at least 185 thousand on the roads of the enemy’s Minsk Railway Directorate. Second operation: 120 thousand participated, 146,149 rails were blown up, including 89 thousand within the Minsk Directorate. In total, 250 thousand rails were broken in the Minsk Directorate, or 60 percent of all rails undermined in 1943.

Of these 250 thousand, 25 thousand were blown up in unnecessary, unused areas. This slowed down the rate of restoration of highways during the advance of the Red Army.

The share of traffic interruptions caused by rail explosions on the stretches between intermediate stations reached 24 percent of the total traffic interruptions caused by all partisan actions. But on sections between hub stations there were only 10.1 percent of such interruptions, and on routes - less than 3 percent, while crashes accounted for about 60 percent of interruptions. On January 1, 1943, there were 11 million rails in the occupied territory, and the demolition of 350 thousand rails was only 3 percent: quite tolerable, especially since the explosions sometimes took place where the occupiers themselves could not undermine the rails during their retreat.

The number of Wehrmacht trains delivered not only did not decrease with the increase in the number of undermined rails, but, on the contrary, even increased, since the more rails were torn, the fewer train wrecks they caused. The partisans used about 50 tons of explosives to blow up the rails in August and the first half of September. This was enough to derail at least 1,500 trains. The smartest of the partisan commanders understood this, and from September they began to reduce rail explosions, while simultaneously increasing the number of derailments.

What was required in return?

The fight against the enemy army for partisans can only be carried out by organizing crashes, blowing up cars and armored vehicles with mines and, under favorable conditions, ambush attacks. The battles of the partisans with Wehrmacht units in its rear were associated with greater losses for the partisans than at the front. Two Ukrainian and six Leningrad partisan regiments, having entered into direct combat contact with the occupiers, despite their heroism, were defeated.

The enemy's operational railway network as of January 1, 1943 amounted to 22 thousand km. The partisans carried out acts of sabotage almost without losses in areas where there were at least two thousand enemy soldiers per 100 km. Only the most important sections of roads were protected in this way. If the partisans committed sabotage along the entire length, and the enemy increased the security density to a regiment for every 100 km, then the total number of railway guards in the occupied territories would exceed 400 thousand people - but even this would not save the railway from partisan saboteurs.

As was known from the testimony of the Germans and from intelligence data, the enemy’s most critical situation was with the steam locomotives. When the Red Army retreated, the locomotives were evacuated or disabled. Hitler's command was forced to assemble locomotives on the roads throughout Europe, not disdaining the most backward ones, and drive them to the East. The so-called ersatz steam locomotive M-50 appeared, which began to be produced by locomotive factories in Germany for the eastern railways. The locomotive fleet was catastrophically reduced from attacks by partisans, aviation, Resistance forces in the West, as well as from wear and tear.

The greatest interruption in the movement of trains was achieved not by the erroneous “rail war”, but by the destruction of bridges and train crashes. Since the bridges were heavily guarded, in winter it was possible to paralyze traffic by simultaneously cutting off the water supply in a certain area. The destruction of the communication line - so spectacular - hampered the work of transport, but did not stop it for a long time.

Dictionary of historical concepts

Autocephaly (from Greek auto - himself, mullet - head) - self-government, independence of the church. Autocephalous in Orthodoxy is an administratively independent local church, headed by a patriarch or metropolitan. Autocephaly does not mean the absolute independence of the local church. All autocephalous churches are parts of the one Universal Church of Christ.

Autonomy is the independent exercise of state power or broad internal self-government provided to the people living compactly within the borders of the state.

Annexation is the forcible annexation by one state of the territory of another state.

The Home Army is a Polish military formation that fought on the territory of Western Belarus for the liberation of Poland and the restoration of its borders until September 1939.

Belarusization is a policy of nation-state and national-cultural construction in the BSSR in the 1920s.

Bolshevization of the Soviets - the growing influence of the Bolsheviks on the masses, accompanied by an increase in their representation in the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

A buffer state is a state between two neighboring countries that reduces or even eliminates the contradictions between them.

Genocide is the destruction of certain population groups based on race, nationality or religion.

Ghettos are special neighborhoods in cities (urban concentration camps), created by the Nazis in occupied territory to exterminate the Jewish population.

Civil war is an armed struggle for state power within one country between different social and political groups.

Industrialization is the process of creating large-scale machine production in industry and other sectors of the national economy.

Intervention is the violent intervention of one or more states in the internal affairs of another state.

The canonical church is the general name for most of the Orthodox autocephalous churches. The canonical church is a church that complies with the Orthodox canons (laws), i.e., a real church.

Collaborationism is the policy of cooperation with the occupiers.

Collectivization - the unification of individual farms of peasants into large ones collective farms(collective farms).

Contribution is money or material assets received by the victorious state from the country that was defeated in the war.

Cooperation is a voluntary association of people to work together. For example, a partnership for joint cultivation of land, a trading cooperative, etc. The income of the members of the cooperative depends on the property invested in the common business.

Indigenization is one of the main directions of the Belarusization policy, which provides for increasing the role of people of indigenous nationality in the socio-political life of the republic, promoting personnel from the indigenous population to party, Soviet, economic and public work.

“Eastern Kresy” is the official name of the Western Belarusian lands within Poland shi.

Mobilization is the transfer of the armed forces of a state from a peaceful state to combat readiness; mass conscription during war into the armed forces of citizens liable for military service who are in reserve; another call for military service for young men of the appropriate age.

People's militia - voluntary military and paramilitary units (work detachments, self-defense groups, detachments of party and Soviet activists, etc.) from citizens who are not subject to priority conscription for mobilization.

National democracy is a direction of socio-political thought that combines general democratic ideas and goals with the tasks of social and national liberation of oppressed peoples.

Nationalization is the transfer of land, enterprises, and other means of production from private ownership to state ownership.

Occupation is the occupation by the troops of one state of the territory or part of the territory of another state, accompanied by the establishment of its own administration and laws.

Operation Bagration was an offensive operation of the Red Army from June 23 to August 29, 1944, during which the territory of the BSSR was liberated from the Nazi invaders.

Osadniki are former officers of the Polish army, who were awarded for their services in the Polish-Soviet war of 1919-1920. Polish authorities distributed plots of Western Belarusian lands.

Ostarbeiters are “eastern workers”; population from the occupied territory of the USSR, transported to forced labor in Germany.

Partisan zone - territory controlled by partisans.

The partisan movement is an armed struggle of broad sections of the population, united in organized formations in occupied territories, against the aggressor for state independence.

Plan "Ost" - a plan of Hitler's Germany, which provided for the colonization and Germanization of the territory Eastern Europe, including the BSSR

Underground struggle is the illegal activity of bodies and organizations, individual representatives of the population in territory captured by the enemy, aimed at disrupting the occupation policy and restoring national-state independence.

The policy of “sanitation” (recovery) is a complex of socio-economic and political measures carried out in Poland, including Western Belarus, by the head of the Polish state J. Pilsudski.

“Prishchepovshchina” is a direction in agrarian policy (named after the People’s Commissar of Agriculture of the BSSR D. Prishchepov), in which the emphasis was placed on the development of the farm system.

Tax in kind is an element of the new economic policy that replaced food appropriation. The amount of the tax in kind was calculated from the area of ​​crops and was announced to the peasants even before the start of agricultural work.

Prodrazverstka is an element of the policy of “war communism”, a system of procurement of agricultural products, according to which peasants were obliged to hand over all surplus products to the state.

Requisition is the forced alienation of property into the ownership or temporary use of the state; forced taxes levied on the population by the occupation authorities.

“Rail War” - coordinated operations of Soviet partisans and underground fighters for the massive destruction of railway communications (rails, bridges, stations, trains) behind enemy lines.

Sectarianism (religious) is the general name of religious groups, associations, separating shi xya from the dominant church (in Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Christianity).

The Surazh (Vitebsk) “gate” is a 40-kilometer breakthrough in the line of the Soviet-German front between Velizh and Usvyaty, through which partisan detachments communicated with the “Mainland”.

Federation - form government system, in which the states (states, lands, republics, etc.) forming a union are subordinate to a single center and retain independence in resolving individual issues of domestic policy.

Evacuation - targeted removal of the population, industrial equipment yt-land and agricultural enterprises, food, property, material and cultural assets from places threatened by occupation.

• Section I. OCTOBER REVOLUTION. CREATION OF BELARUSIAN STATE
• § 2. Events of the October Revolution in Belarus and on the Western Front
• § 4-5. Proclamation and formation of Belarusian statehood
• § 7. Belarusian statehood in the conditions of the Civil War. Second proclamation of the SSRB
• Generalization lesson on section I “October Revolution. Creation of Belarusian statehood"
• Section II. BELARUS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST SOCIETY. WESTERN BELARUS UNDER POLAND AUTHORITY

Combat air support for guerrilla operations

In a number of cases, there was such close coordination of partisan actions with Soviet aviation operations that one can speak of combat air support. There were two types of aviation operations: providing air support to the partisans by attacking the enemy and providing the partisans with additional resources to repel the enemy.

In tactical terms, Soviet aviation could provide support in several ways. From time to time, the partisans made radio requests to bomb villages with a hostile population and villages where, according to their information, German units were located. There was a case when a plane attacked a German train that had derailed as a result of an explosion caused by partisans. In March 1943, a Soviet plan emerged to destroy the Kaminsky Brigade, a collaborationist organization that enjoyed administrative autonomy in several areas in the south of the Bryansk region; To carry out the operation, it was assumed that a partisan attack and a Soviet air raid would be used together. The Germans revealed this plan, and it was carried out only in terms of carrying out the raid. At the beginning of 1943, the towns and villages of the Bryansk region, where the headquarters of German units were located, were repeatedly bombed. And in April 1944, a special airborne unit of the Red Army was parachuted to provide support to partisan detachments intending to attack several villages that had self-defense detachments. No other examples of such actions were found. There is no doubt that there were more, but it is clear that such cooperation was carried out on a small scale and was not important for the operations carried out by the partisans. However, the Germans were concerned about the possibility of partisan attacks on their strongholds - especially on bridges - after German personnel took refuge in fear of an air raid. More often, Soviet air force aircraft tried to assist the partisans when the Germans carried out major operations against them. By raiding German headquarters, supply lines, and troop columns, the planes sought to relieve the pressure exerted on the partisans and give them the opportunity to escape from encirclement. Reports of such air actions are contained in reports on almost all major operations against partisans, as well as on several operations of a smaller scale. Once, during one night, 156 aircraft carried out a mission to support the partisans, but, as a rule, these combat operations of Soviet aviation against the German forces fighting the partisans were not very successful. The reasons for this were various factors. In most cases, the number of aircraft was so small that one could hardly expect any other results other than increasing the morale of the partisans. As the number of such assignments increased, a number of other factors inherent various situations, reduced the chances of success. German operations against partisans usually consisted of concentrated attacks on large areas in partisan hands. Numerous small units of German troops, forming a wide circle, began to slowly advance towards the center, combing the area in search of partisans in the hope of forcing them into battle when they were driven into a corner. Small groups of German soldiers moving through wooded areas were unlikely to present promising targets for air attack. This was probably also a difficult task from a technical standpoint. Although the partisans were able to communicate with the aircraft by radio, in the tense conditions of operations the communications were unlikely to function well enough to coordinate the actions of Soviet aviation with the partisans' attempts to break through.

Another type of air support was the air transportation of weapons and ammunition to partisan units that were short of them as a result of German operations. In such cases, the partisans often requested weapons and ammunition by radio. In October 1943, the regiment under the command of Grishin found itself in an extremely difficult situation as a result of a major operation carried out against it by the Germans. When the detachment's requests for the delivery of weapons and ammunition by air were not heard, such a request was sent directly to Stalin. “We have been surrounded for six days now... We have neither food nor ammunition. For ten days we asked the higher command for help. We haven’t received anything... We ask you to help us.” After this, air delivery was promised, and the Germans noted that weapons and ammunition were indeed dropped by parachute. Several similar cases have occurred in such large areas partisan actions, such as the Bryansk Forest and the northern part of Belarus. In the latter case, air supplies were carried out during a major German operation against partisans in the Lepel area in early 1944, the number of aircraft sorties reaching hundreds in one night.

Let us now consider the largest operations carried out during the partisan movement during the Second World War.

4.1. Rail War.

The Rail War is a major operation carried out by Soviet partisans during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 - in August - September 1943 in the occupied territories of the RSFSR, BSSR and part of the Ukrainian SSR with the aim of disabling the railway. enemy communications. In June 1943, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus put forward a plan for the simultaneous massive destruction of sections of railways in the occupied territory of the republic. The central headquarters of the partisan movement (TSSHPD) involved in the implementation of this plan, in addition to the partisans of Belarus, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol and part of the Ukrainian partisans. Operation "Rail War" was associated with the plans of the Supreme High Command to complete the defeat of the Nazi troops in Battle of Kursk, the Smolensk operation of 1943 and the offensive to liberate Left Bank Ukraine.

Restored in May 1942, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement began to develop a plan for the first partisan operation on the enemy’s railway communications of a strategic scale. The operation plan was based on the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus “On the destruction of the enemy’s railway communications using the “Rail War” method, i.e., destruction of the rail bed by mine-explosive and other methods. guerrilla rail war on enemy communications" it was pointed out that "the enormous growth and scope of the partisan movement makes it possible at present to deliver massive widespread attacks on railways with the aim of completely disorganizing them and disrupting the enemy's operations at the fronts." The possibility of achieving the strategic goal - the complete disorganization of railway communications behind enemy lines did not raise doubts either in the control bodies of the partisan movement or in the partisan detachments themselves. However, the way to achieve the goal was to undermine two hundred thousand rails met with objections.

On January 1, 1943, the length of the railways operated by the enemy reached 34,979 km, which amounted to 2,798,320 pieces of rails attached to the railway bed (the length of the rail at that time was 12.5 m). Hundreds of thousands of rails were in reserve for replacement. Therefore, this method of achieving the goal of the operation, according to military sabotage experts, was not entirely appropriate. Thus, the technical department of the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement under the leadership of the deputy head of the Ukrainian Broadband Operations Division for sabotage, Colonel I.G. Starinov, with the help of the Central Directorate of Military Communications of the Red Army, calculated the effectiveness of the destruction of 85 - 90 thousand rails, intended, according to the operation plan, to be undermined by Ukrainian partisans. Calculations showed that the indicated number of rails was only 2% of the 4,000,000 pieces of rails available in the occupied part of Ukraine, and all available mine-explosive means had to be spent on blasting them. The VOSO certificate stated that the enemy does not lack rails and even sends some of them for melting down and that the most vulnerable point in the German railway communications system are steam locomotives, of which there are less than 5,000 throughout the occupied part of the USSR. This assessment was later confirmed by a German researcher in this region of G. Teske, who wrote that Germany “in 1939 had a much smaller fleet of steam locomotives and carriages than the Kaiser’s Empire in 1914. This was due to the overestimation of the engine. It was not possible to completely correct this error during the war itself.” The explosion of the rails, in addition, caused a break in traffic only for the time necessary to replace them (several hours), while significantly complicating the normal operation of the railway tracks after the liberation of the territory from the Germans. Ultimately, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement managed to obtain the right to begin preparations for the operation, concentrating the main efforts on arranging the crashes of military trains, i.e. disable enemy trains rather than undermine the rails. On May 30, 1943, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) decided to start not a “rail war,” but a “war on rails.”

The operation was planned in three stages, each lasting 15-30 days. The operation was scheduled to begin approximately on August 1-5, 1943 with a sudden launch of the first massive strategic strike, simultaneously blowing up 26,000 rails. In the first 15 days, the main railway communications in the rear of Army Group Center were to be destroyed. In the future, it was planned to carry out several other massive attacks and, having paralyzed traffic on the remaining railway communications, subsequently move on to systematic sabotage actions to prevent the operation of railway communications behind enemy lines. The grouping of partisan forces created to carry out the operation included 167 partisan brigades, separate detachments and groups with a total number of 95,615 people, deployed over a territory extending over 1,000 km along the front and in depth from the front line to the western border of the USSR, which indicated a strategic scale and special the nature of the group. The partisan group that existed behind enemy lines was already so powerful that the partisan formations were located near most of the most important railway communications. Therefore, the redeployment of partisan formations, if necessary, was carried out at a distance of 70-80 km and only sometimes more than 100 km.

To carry out the tasks of blowing up rails and other objects on the railways to the rear of the partisans, it was necessary to additionally deliver 200-250 tons of explosives. The main difficulty in preparing the operation was the need to allocate the flight capacity of Li-2 or Si-47 transport aircraft to deliver the necessary cargo.

Thus, the transfer of explosives and other means behind enemy lines required 400 sorties during July-August, including 180 sorties over 5-6 days, starting on July 12 in preparation for the first sabotage strike. The significant dependence of the success of the operation on the actions of aviation confirmed the significant influence of this factor on the scale and content of sabotage and other special actions behind enemy lines. The need to transport many hundreds of tons of cargo for partisans behind enemy lines required the centralized and systematic use of aviation formations and units. By mid-1943, two air transport divisions, twelve separate air regiments, several long-range aviation regiments, squadrons of front-line and army aviation and airborne troops were operating in the interests of the partisans. In total, during the war years, 109 thousand sorties were flown to the partisans, 96% of the flights were made at night. The use of aviation in the interests of partisans revealed a number of essential requirements and features of the combat use of aviation forces and assets.

Local headquarters of the partisan movement and their representation at the fronts assigned areas and objects of action to each partisan formation. The partisans were provided with explosives and fuses, mine-explosive classes were held at “forest courses”, metal was mined from captured shells and bombs at local “factories”, and fastenings for metal bombs to rails were made in workshops and forges. Reconnaissance was actively carried out on the railways. The operation began on the night of August 3 and continued until mid-September. The actions took place on an area with a length of about 1000 km along the front and 750 km in depth, about 100 thousand partisans took part in them, who were helped by the local population.

On the very first night, three brigades operating in the Volkhov Front zone disabled 1,032 rails. On the Vitebsk road between the Cholovo and Torkovichi stations, detachments of the 11th brigade blew up 436 rails. Near the Plyussa station of the Warsaw Railway, detachments of the 5th Brigade destroyed 286 rails. And detachments of the 2nd brigade in the Zarechye area blew up a bridge and 310 rails.

It must be said that the Leningrad partisans carried out the first massive attack on the railways after the Oryol partisans and several days earlier than the main forces that took part in the Rail War - in other regions this operation began on the night of August 3-4. By this time, the force of attacks on enemy communications near Leningrad had increased noticeably; the Rail War had become not a short-term campaign, but a permanent form of struggle against the enemy. Sabotage was organized not only by partisan units, but also by inter-district underground party centers. For example, the Kingisepp center carried out a series of attacks on the Baltic road, which the Nazis had previously considered “calm”, and the Pskov center carried out a series of attacks on the Pskov-Weimarn road, south of the zone of action of the 2nd LPB. Despite all the measures taken, the Nazis were no longer able to secure their railway communications could.

The results of the first strike and further sabotage actions during August had a significant impact on the operation of the railways, but it was not possible to completely paralyze traffic. In the log of military operations of the headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command after the first massive strike, it is noted: “August 4. East. Railway traffic in the East often stops due to the explosion of rails (in the area of ​​Army Group Center on August 3 there were 75 major accidents and 1,800 explosions). Train traffic in the area of ​​Army Group Center has been suspended for 48 hours since August 4."

The scale of the “rail war” near Leningrad is indicated by the following figures: in August, partisans blew up over 11 thousand rails (this is tantamount to the complete destruction of the railway track along the entire length of the road from Leningrad to Luga), destroyed 20 railway bridges, 34 kilometers of telegraph and telephone communications, derailed 21 enemy trains. Huge traffic jams formed at the stations; trains waiting for the route to be restored became an excellent target for attacks by our aircraft. At the end of the month in Pskov, for example, 50 trains stuck at the station were immediately attacked by air. Meanwhile, the battle on the rails was just heating up. By mid-November, the total number of rails destroyed by Leningrad partisans exceeded 52.5 thousand. This means that a route with a total length of more than 650 kilometers was disabled.

In early November, partisans intercepted a large batch of letters from Nazi soldiers to their relatives and friends near the village of Zryachaya Gora, Karamyshevsky district.

The powerful blow to the railway lines was unexpected for the enemy, who for some time could not counteract the partisans in an organized manner. During the operation, about 215 thousand rails were blown up, many trains were derailed, railway bridges and station buildings were blown up. The massive disruption of enemy communications significantly complicated the regrouping of retreating enemy troops, complicated their supply, and thereby contributed to the successful offensive of the Red Army.

In total, from July 20 to September 16, 1943, according to the operational department of the TsShPD, during Operation Rail War, 214,705 pieces of rails were disabled, which accounted for 4.3% of all rails on the operated sections of the railways. Based on the results of the last operation, the leadership of the Central Shipping Division made some conclusions, and during the next operation on the railway communications "Concert", which lasted from September 20 to November 30, 1943, the sabotage actions of the partisans were largely aimed at disabling the enemy's rolling stock. At the same time, during September - November 1943, according to the TsShPD plan, a special operation "Desert" was carried out to destroy the water supply system on railway communications. As a result of the operation, 43 water pumping stations were disabled. However, a significant reduction in combat capabilities for committing sabotage due to a lack of mine-explosive weapons did not allow the partisan formations to paralyze the work of the enemy’s railway communications.