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Combat log of the 323rd Infantry Division. The war will ask for everything

COMBAT ROUTES OF TAMBOV MILITARY FORMATIONS The 2nd Guards Army was formed in the Tambov region in the fall of 1942 on the basis of formations and units that had already taken part in battles as a reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The army included the 1st and 13th Guards Rifle Corps and the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps. As part of the Don and Stalingrad fronts, the army took part in the Battle of Stalingrad, the liberation of the Rostov region, and in the defense along the Mius River. In August - early November 1943, as part of the Southern (from October 20, 1943 - 4th Ukrainian) Front, the 2nd Guards Army participated in the Donbass and Melitopol offensive operations. After redeployment to the Perekop Isthmus region in April - May 1944, they took part in the liberation of Crimea and the assault on Sevastopol. In May - June 1944, the army was redeployed to the area of the cities of Dorogobuzh and Yelnya and on July 8 was included in the 1st Baltic Front. Consisting of the 11th and 13th Guards and 54th Rifle Corps, the 2nd Guards Army participated in the Siauliai and Memel offensive operations. In December 1944, the army was transferred to the 3rd Belorussian Front and, as part of it, participated in the East Prussian operation. Formed on the basis of the 22nd Guards Rifle Division as the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, which became part of the 2nd Guards Army, as part of the troops of the Stalingrad, Southern, 4th, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts, it participated in the Battle of Stalingrad , in the battles for the liberation of Rostov, in the Donbass, Melitopol, Nikopol, Krivoy Rog, Odessa, Budapest, Vienna, Bratislava-Brnov and Prague operations. For military services, the corps was awarded the honorary names “Nikolaevsky” (April 1944) and “Budapest” (April 1945), and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and Suvorov, 2nd degree. 24 thousand soldiers of the corps were awarded orders and medals, 28 were awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union. The 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps is noted in the encyclopedia “The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945” among the formations that particularly distinguished themselves during the Great Patriotic War Patriotic War. Commanded the troops of the 2nd Guards Army: Major General Ya. G. Kreiser (from February 1943, Lieutenant General, October-November 1942), Lieutenant General R. Ya. Malinovsky (November 1942 - February 1943 g.), Major General G. F. Zakharov (July 1943 - June 1944), Lieutenant General P. G. Chanchibadze (June 1944 - May 1945). 323rd Rifle Division The division was formed in August-September 1941 in the Tambov region (Tambov region). At the end of November 1941, she arrived on the Western Front and took part in the battles for Moscow as part of the 10th Army. Entered battle on December 7 near the city of Mikhailov Ryazan region, then participated in the liberation of the cities of Epifan, Duminichi, Lyudinovo. As part of the 16th Army, it fought defensive battles in the winter of 1941 - 1942. In the battle for Moscow she suffered heavy losses. By February 1, 1942, there were still active bayonets in the division's regiments: in the 1086th rifle regiment - 29, in the 1088th - 44, in the 1090th - 62. After being re-equipped in 1942, it operated in the area of the cities of Kirov and Zhizdra, Kaluga region. After heavy fighting and losses suffered, she was transferred to the reserve of the Western Front. For the successful conduct of combat operations, the 1086th Infantry Regiment of the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner on March 31, 1942. In the summer of 1943, the 323rd Rifle Division as part of the Bryansk Front participated in the liberation of the city of Bryansk, for which it was given the honorary name “Bryansk”. In the summer of the same year, the division took part in the liberation of the cities of Pochep, Unecha, Klintsy, Novozybkov. In 1944, during the Belarusian offensive operation, the 323rd Rifle Division took part in the liberation of the cities of Gomel, Zhlobin, Rogachev, Bobruisk, Minsk and others. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 9, 1944, the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. On August 9, 1944, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the 1088th Infantry Regiment of the division was given the honorary name “Bialystok”. In 1944 and 1945, as part of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, the division took part in the liberation of Poland, crossed the Oder and Vistula rivers and ended its combat journey on German territory near the city of Luckenwalde near Berlin. On February 19, 1945, the division was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree. The full name of the division is the 323rd Red Banner Bryansk Order of Suvorov 2nd degree rifle division. The banner of one of the regiments of division 1086 is kept in the Tambov Regional Museum of Local Lore. Division commanders: Major General I. A. Gartsev (1941 - May 1942), then Colonels I. O. Naryshkin, A. M. Bakhtizin (killed on August 11, 1942), S. F. Ukraintsev, A. M. Chernyak, Major General Hero of the Soviet Union V. T. Maslov (1944 - 1945). 325th Infantry Division

323rd Red Banner Bryansk Order of Suvorov Rifle Division

In August-September 1941, in Tambov at the Tregulyai station, the 323rd Infantry Division was formed, consisting mainly of Tambov residents.
On October 21, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued a directive on the formation of the 10th Reserve Army by December 2, 1941, with direct subordination to its Headquarters. The army included: 326th Rifle Division - Penza; 324th - Penza; 322nd - Kuznetsk; 330th - Syzran; 323rd Rifle Division Petrovsk. In addition, two rifle brigades were to arrive from the Ural Military District. The army headquarters was deployed in the city of Kuznetsk.
On November 29, 1941, units of this army (according to the directive of November 24, 1941 No. op/2995) were redeployed to the following points: 328th Infantry Division - Turlatovo, Vygorodok; 322nd Rifle Division - Rybnoye; 330th Rifle Division - Ryazan; 323rd Rifle Division - Spassk-Ryazansky; 326th Rifle Division - Shilovo; 57th Cavalry Division - Kanino (northeast of Ryazhsk); 75th Cavalry Division - Ryazan.
The army headquarters and communications units were located in Shilovo. It was ordered to complete the concentration of the army by the evening of December 2, and on December 4 (according to Directive No. 0044/op) to deliver the main blow in the direction of Mikhailov, Stalinogorsk.
The 10th Reserve Army of General Golikov, included in the front, reached the front on December 6: 322nd Infantry Division - Klemovo, Okunkovo, Rybkino (5 km east of Okunkovo); The 330th Infantry Division fought around Mikhailov from the north; The 328th Infantry Division fought at Mikhailov, on its eastern side; The 323rd Rifle Division from a line north of Slobodka attacked Mikhailov from the southeast; 324th Rifle Division - Slobodka, Pecherniki; 325th Rifle Division - Pecherniki, Berezovo; 326th Rifle Division - Durnoye, Semenovskoye; The 41st Cavalry Division from the Vysokoye area moved to Katino; The 239th Rifle Division, remaining in the army reserve, had the task of reaching the Durnoye, Telyatniki area (2 km northwest of Durnoye) by the end of December 6; The 57th Cavalry Division, remaining in the army reserve, was supposed to reach the Mamonovo and Bulychevo area by the end of December 6; The 75th Cavalry Division was located in Ryazan, and after December 6 it was transferred to the left flank of the army.
On December 10, 1941, the Epifan station and the village of Mikhailovka were liberated by the troops of the 10th Army, the 1086th Regiment of the 323rd Infantry Division. The regiment was commanded by A.A. Bogdanov.
In December, the division took part in the battles for Moscow, and then liberated the cities of Epifan, Duminichi, Lyudinovo. [Photo of Tambov residents from the 323rd Infantry Division in November 1941. before being sent to the front.]
In the battle for Moscow, the division suffered heavy losses.
The division's personnel losses indicate what kind of battles they were.
By the beginning of February 1942, its rifle regiments included:
in the 1086th regiment - 29,
in 1088 – 44,
in 1090 - 64 bayonets.
Thus, from the regular composition of the rifle regiments of the division (excluding the divisional artillery regiment and other structural divisions) only 139 people remained in the ranks, i.e. in total there are less than two rifle companies, which were later consolidated into 1086 rifle regiments. For the successful conduct of combat operations by the 1086th Regiment in the spring of 1942, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
After the division was completed to full strength in 1942, it operated in the Kaluga region. For the operation to liberate Bryansk, the 323rd Infantry Division was given the name “Bryansk”.
In 1944–45, the division liberated Belarus, Poland, and Germany from fascist invaders.
On February 19, 1945, she was awarded the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree.
The 323rd Red Banner Bryansk Order of Suvorov 2nd Class Infantry Division completed its combat journey on German territory near the city of Luckenwalde.
The battle flag of one of the regiments - the 1086th - is kept in the regional Tambov Museum of Local Lore.
On the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Great Victory, the name of the division was immortalized on a stele installed at the Tregulyai station in the Tambov region.

Mishin Ivan Timofeevich

Short biography.

Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, born in 1901, was born and lived in the village of Muchkap, Muchkap district, Tambov region.

He was married and had three daughters: Raya, Zina and Yulia. Yulia - this is Igor Sukhinin's mother - was the smallest.
She was only two years old when her father went to the front.

Ivan Timofeevich was known as a jack of all trades. He made felt boots best of all in the village - it helped the family live.

As Igor’s grandmother, Ivan Timofeevich’s wife, said, they lived very well. He loved both her and his daughters very much.

In 1941, at the age of 40, he was drafted into the ranks of the Red Army to defend the Motherland by the Muchkap RVC of the Tambov region.

In 1943, the wife received information that her husband, Red Army soldier Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, a native of the Muchkapsky district of the Tambov region, was missing in December 1942 while at the front of the Great Patriotic War.

In 1945, a man came to the Mishins’ house.
It was a fellow soldier of Ivan Timofeevich. He did not stay long; he was in a hurry to go home from the front.
He gave Ivan Timofeevich’s wife something from her husband’s documents, which Ivan Timofeevich accidentally left somewhere.
It turns out that they knew each other, at the front at that time they were not quite close, but then, before those last battles Ivan Timofeevich, we met...
Ivan Timofeevich’s wife, of course, asked him about her husband. He answered evasively, saying that he himself had not seen them among the dead...
He said that after those battles only a few survived...
And he himself did not die then only because before those battles he was hospitalized...

Many years later, the grandmother told her grandson that only later did she understand that her husband’s fellow soldier simply took pity on her when he saw her with three small children in her arms, and therefore did not tell her directly about the death of her husband.

Until her death, Ivan Timofeevich’s wife never got married, she was still waiting for her husband.
She lived the rest of her life in ignorance of her husband’s difficult fate, raising three daughters alone.

On May 24, 2007, from the military commissariat of the city of Uvarovo, Uvarovsky and Muchkapsky districts of the Tambov region, at the request of the relatives of Mishin I.T. received, issued on the basis of the Book of Memory, confirming that Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, born in 1901, went missing in December 1942.
And only after the United Database “Memorial” appeared on the Internet, based on scanned documents from the military archive of TsAMO, Mishin Ivan Timofeevich’s own grandson, Igor Vladimirovich Sukhinin, was able to find out the real truth about the fate of his grandfather. And together with their grandson, Ivan Timofeevich’s daughters also learned the truth.

In fact, Mishin I.T. died in January 1942 while serving in the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the 1086th Infantry Regiment of the 323rd (1st Formation) Infantry Division as part of the 10th Army.

Report of the 323rd Infantry Division dated August 16, 1942.

In total, this report consists of 13 pages.

Report irretrievable losses were reported from the headquarters of the 323rd SD on August 16, 1942 to the Recruitment Department of the 10th Army. This was the first page of the report.

On second page The headquarters of the 323rd Infantry Division dated August 9-10, 1942 reports that the lists compiled for 70 dead and 53 missing soldiers of the 1086th Infantry Division arrived late due to heavy fighting.

On fourth page , fifth page And page six The 1086th Infantry Regiment itself reported on 08/05/1942 to the headquarters of the 323rd Infantry Division that starting from January 1942, the regiment was not able to promptly send data on irretrievable losses of personnel, as it took part in heavy battles.

These heavy battles began with an offensive near the village. Perevles on December 4-5, 1941. This means that these 70 dead and 53 missing soldiers died between December 4, 1941 and August 5, 1942.
The battles were so heavy that there was no way to keep records of personnel in a timely manner, and sometimes there was no one. Even clerks fought with the enemy in the same ranks as ordinary soldiers. Sometimes during battles already compiled lists were destroyed.
In the later compiled lists, the fighters did not have social data, since for obvious reasons there was no one to find out about them.
That’s why some of the fighters on the list didn’t even have a first and patronymic name.

Further in the report to seventh page there is a headline saying that further (on page 8) there is a personal list of 70 dead soldiers of the 1086th joint venture, whose addresses are not known, all for the same reasons.

And now we can look ninth page, on which we see among the dead soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Battalion, number 39, Ivan Timofeevich Mishin is recorded.

A little bit of history battle path 1086th Infantry Regiment
323rd Red Banner Bryansk named after. Suvorov 2nd degree rifle division.
(from the site http://www.rkka.ru/docs/spv/SPV15.htm)

FROM A POLITICAL REPORT OF THE 1086th RIFLE REGIMENT OF THE 323rd RIFLE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT

December 20
Secret

To the head of the political department of the 323rd [rifle] division]

While in battle from December 17 to December 19, 1941, the regiment suffered heavy losses, especially among the command staff. In the first battalion there was only one battalion commander and his deputy. The same is true in other battalions. In addition to them, the battalions have 2-3 commanders.

Military commissar 1086 from [rifle] regiment
[signature illegible]

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 9. L. 47

FROM THE REPORT OF THE 323rd RIFLE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT ABOUT LOSSES IN OFFENSIVE BATTLES FROM DECEMBER 17 TO 19, 1941

[To the headquarters of the 323rd Infantry Division]

During the offensive from 17 to 19.12.41:

	Beginning composition	Jr. beginning composition	Privates
Killed [persons]	38	72	386
Injured [person]	110	230	954
Sick [person]	8	3	59
[person] missing	19	97	1084
Total [persons]	188	452	3498

<...>
Chief of Staff of the 323rd Rifle Division
[signature illegible]

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 9. L. 48

---- *** ----

(from the site http://www.megatula.ru/site/tulskii_krai/raionnye_centry/63/)

At 10 o'clock in the morning on November 23, 1941, the fascist German troops captured the Epifan railway station and the village of Mikhailovka. The Nazis ruled our village for only 17 days, but during this time they managed to inflict enormous damage on the economy. The post office, hospital, canteen and all residential buildings on Sovetskaya Street were burned, everything was looted public buildings. Three residents of the village were killed: a groom for not quickly handing over the harness, a Komsomol member Zhukov and a sick old man (deaf) for not turning around when the German shouted.

Details of the damage caused to the village and the Epifan railway station can be found in the acts of the commission for recording the damage caused to the village and the region by the Nazi invaders during the occupation. In such difficult times, the Kimovites remained faithful to their people, their Motherland. Take this example. During the retreat, our troops were forced to leave their wounded comrades behind. The population hid them from the Nazis, but those who hid the wounded were threatened with certain death by order of the occupiers. The doctor at the district hospital, Emma Nikolaevna Vorobyova, did bandages at night. She knew well how this could end, because her close friend from the Grankovskaya hospital, Valeria Aleksandrovna Efremova, was hanged for this.

On December 10, 1941, the fascist barbarians retreated under the attack of our troops. Epifan station and the village of Mikhailovka were liberated by troops of the 10th Army, 1086th Regiment of the 323rd Infantry Division. The regiment was commanded by A.A. Bogdanov (at the end of the war, colonel).

In the 1st photo: The memorial on the outskirts of the Karachevsky forest near the road to Epifan.
In the 2nd photo: A monument stone in the park behind the building of the former Pobeda cinema.

Here is how Alexander Alexandrovich said: “At about twelve o’clock at night on December 9, the headquarters of the regiment, which I commanded, stopped in the village of Urusovo, which is three kilometers from the Epifan station. There were Germans at the railway station. To find out what forces the enemy had, I sent reconnaissance At about three in the morning, already on December 10, I was informed that there were only a few dozen Germans at the station and that there were three cars standing near the house where they were located. We definitely established that the Germans could retreat only towards Epifani. It was necessary to block the path. retreat to the fascists. For this purpose, the third battalion of the regiment was given the command of Art. Lieutenant Zotov: to bypass the Karachevsky forest from the east, enter the southern side of it and occupy the highway leading from the railway station to the city of Epifan.

Since there were few Germans at the railway station, I decided not to use artillery, so as not to destroy the station and the houses of civilians. As soon as it began to dawn, we fired several shots at the Germans from a 120-mm mortar and went on the attack.

2nd battalion under the command of Art. Lieutenant S. Kharlampovich advanced from Dvorikov along railway towards the station. And the first battalion under the command of Art. Lieutenant Chernykh advanced to the north, bypassing the railway station from the west.

The Germans did not expect such a rapid attack, they ran out of the two-story house, got into their cars and began to retreat towards Epifani, as we had expected.”

And here is what the GA told us at the meeting in Leningrad. Zotov, who lived there recent years of our lives: “We walked around the Karachevsky forest and set up an ambush on the highway near some houses. When three German cars with soldiers drove up the highway in the Karachevsky forest, we fired at the head with a 45-mm gun and hit the engine directly. The second car I tried to go around it on the left side, but it turned over into a deep ditch. (The locals were taking sand for construction). The Germans abandoned the third car and tried to escape into the forest. But our ambush was completely destroyed.”

Among the killed Germans, according to A.A. Bogdanov, was a German colonel, apparently from Guderian’s entourage, as Marshal F.I. wrote about. Golikov in his book "In the Moscow Battle".

Thus, the Epifan railway station and the village of Mikhailovka were liberated.
The commander of the 2nd battalion, Sergei Kharlampovich, who liberated the Epifan station, died on the second day during the liberation of the village of Lyutorichi.

About the 323rd Red Banner Bryansk named after. Suvorov 2nd degree rifle division.

66 years ago, in August-September 1941, the 323rd Infantry Division, consisting mainly of Tambov residents, was formed in Tambov at the Tregulyai station, and in November it was sent in trains to the Western Front.

In December, the division took part in the battles for Moscow, and then liberated the cities of Epifan, Duminichi, Lyudinovo.
In the battle for Moscow, the division suffered heavy losses.
The division's personnel losses indicate what kind of battles they were.
By the beginning of February 1942, it consisted of: in the 1086th regiment - 29, in the 1088th - 44, in the 1090th - 64 bayonets.

After being completed in 1942, she operated in the Kaluga region as part of the 1086th Infantry Regiment.

For the successful conduct of hostilities, the regiment was awarded the Order of the Red Banner in the spring of that year.

For the operation to liberate Bryansk, the 323rd Infantry Division was given the name “Bryansk”.

In 1944–45, the division liberated Belarus, Poland, and Germany from fascist invaders.

The 323rd Red Banner Bryansk Order of Suvorov 2nd Class Infantry Division completed its combat journey on German territory near the city of Luckenwalde.

The battle flag of one of the regiments - the 1086th - is kept in the regional Tambov Museum of Local Lore.
On the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Great Victory, the name of the division was immortalized on a stele installed at the Tregulyai station in the Tambov region.

Memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, former commander of the 10th Army.

G. K. Zhukov in his memoirs “Memories and Reflections” repeatedly mentions the actions of the 10th Army, which included the 323rd Rifle Division.

“Few Muscovites probably know what role the 10th Army played in the Battle of Moscow.
Yes, this is not surprising.

The 10th Army fought at the greatest distance from Moscow of all the armies of the Western Front (from 250 to 400 kilometers).
And it arrived on the Western Front as the last of the ten armies that were part of it, arriving literally in the very last days, even hours before the start of the December counteroffensive.
Its concentration was carried out very covertly: from the depths of the country, from the Volga, bypassing Moscow from the south, to Ryazan and Ryazhsk.

An army was formed in the Volga region.
The overwhelming number of army soldiers came from the reserves.

We had only three weeks to prepare. Of these, only 14 - 15 days could be used for planned study. Therefore, we immediately introduced a twelve-hour school day.
Night classes were held three times a week.

It was not easy in the short days of forming an army to achieve the dexterity and speed of action of the fighters, to teach them to actively act in battle under enemy fire.
In addition, November in the Volga region turned out to be very cold, and army units were still in summer uniforms.

The training was also hampered by a large shortage of weapons.
What impatience and longing for weapons it reached can be seen from the fact that, when they received guns and machine guns, the Red Army soldiers literally rushed to kiss them.
There was a shortage of both automobile and horse-drawn transport.

The army received winter uniforms, a significant part of weapons and ammunition already on the route, in unloading areas and on the days when troops moved to positions...

Until the end of its offensive, the 10th Army actually had no tanks, remained almost completely without the help of aviation, was not replenished with anti-aircraft or anti-tank weapons, did not have heavy artillery at all, or a single mortar regiment.

"... as for the 10th Army, its task was the liberation of Kozelsk and Sukhinichi
But even earlier Belev lay on our way...

Meanwhile, on December 28, the 323rd division of Colonel I. A. Gartsev, without meeting enemy resistance, crossed the Oka River in the Snykhov area (north of Belev) and successfully moved to the west."

“...The Army Military Council celebrated the New Year at the command post in Kozelsk.
The 10th Army contributed to the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow.
From December 6, it advanced more than 250 kilometers, leaving behind the Pronya, Don, Upa, Plava and Oka rivers, and by December 31, part of its forces was already near Sukhinichi, that is, another 50 - 60 kilometers further."

Carrying out one after another the combat orders of the front, the army divisions fan-shaped moved towards Meshchovsk, Mosalsk, Sukhinichi, Baryatinskaya, Kirov, Lyudinovo, Zhizdra, Ktsyn.
Only the main forces of the 328th Division remained in the army reserve.

All divisions, already accustomed to independent actions in individual directions, completed their tasks in a short time, liberating all the listed settlements, except for Sukhinichi and Zikeev (near Zhizdra), which they only managed to encircle and blockade.
With the occupation of Kirov and Lyudinov, army troops cut the very important operationally-strategically railway line between Vyazma and Bryansk, thereby separating the northern and southern groups of the enemy Army Group Center.

“As I already said, Sukhinichi and Zikeevo were only able to be blocked. They turned out to be occupied by fresh enemy forces arriving from Western Europe.

The 324th Division managed to occupy Sukhinichi only on the morning of January 29. But this was preceded by a stubborn struggle of the main forces of the 10th Army against an enemy counterattack from the Bryansk - Zhizdra - Lyudinovo area to Sukhinichi.

The enemy began his actions on January 10-11 with a strong blow to units of the 322nd Division and pushed them away from Zikeev, releasing his garrison in this locality.
Then, on January 15, 16 and 17, the enemy launched strong attacks with aircraft and tanks with infantry on the 323rd Division and captured the city of Lyudinov.

The 10th Army repelled the enemy's Bryansk counterattack until January 29. During these days, the troops of the enemy group, advancing from Lyudinov towards Sukhinichi, advanced no more than 50 kilometers, and those advancing from Zhizdra, no more than 40 kilometers.

In total, during the period of its offensive from December 6 to January 11, the 10th Army advanced forward a distance of about 400 kilometers.
The liberation of the cities of Mosalsk, Kirov, Lyudinovo, the encirclement of Zikeev near Zhizdra and access to the Ktsyn region were the limit of its offensive success.
The serious operational-strategic significance of the operations carried out by the 10th Army is obvious.
During the battles, we captured 57 tanks, 31 aircraft, up to 300 guns, 200 mortars, 500 machine guns, 2,500 cars and tractors, 2,500 motorcycles and bicycles, two and a half million shells, many enemy rifles, machine guns, cartridges and hand grenades.

These victories were very difficult for the 10th Army.

A lot of sweat and blood was shed.

And in conclusion, I would like to say a great thank you to all the participants in the battles and bare my head to the blessed memory of our fallen comrades.
Their feat will never fade...
It is about them, who gave their lives for the great cause of Victory, that is sung in the song:

The grandson himself found the place of his grandfather’s death.

Thanks to information base site www.soldat.ru, as well as as a result of research into chronicles, memories, memoirs of the Great Patriotic War and with the help of the OBD-Memorial website (http://www.obd-memorial.ru/), the grandson of Mishin Ivan Timofeevich - Igor Sukhinin himself found the place of death of his own grandfather.

According to documents and memoirs, it turns out that Ivan Timofeevich Mishin died in January 1942 near the village of Slobodka, Lyudinovsky district, then Smolensk region.
At this time, his 1086th Infantry Regiment was fighting in that very place.

The village of Slobodka “surfaced” according to the story of that same fellow soldier, Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, who survived and on his way home from the front stopped by Ivan Timofeevich’s wife to give him the documents remaining from the deceased.
It was he who told I.T. Mishin’s wife that he had seen her husband the day before the battle, and it was near the village of Slobodka in what was then still the Smolensk region.
After those battles, almost no one was left alive from the regiment.

In addition to what he knew from his grandmother from a fellow soldier’s story, the grandson also found his full name. those soldiers from my grandfather’s battalion who were on the same name list with my grandfather, reports about irretrievable losses among the dead of the 1086th rifle regiment of the 323rd infantry division, on the obelisk near the village of Slobodka.
True, there were only 88 fighters listed on the obelisk, and only about 300 fighters were buried there (according to the records of the OVK of Kaluga, and the story of a resident of the village of Slobodka, who participated in the burial).

After establishing the place of death of his own grandfather, Ivan Timofeevich Mishin, Igor Sukhinin brought his mother, Yulia Ivanovna, and her sister to their father’s grave near the village of Slobodka, Lyudinovsky district, now Kaluga region.

So, after 66 years of separation, two daughters met their father again...

The truism is that the professional preparedness of the commander and the training of the soldier determine the success of the battle. The number of losses also depends on the ability to fight. Therefore, neglect of military experience and any “savings” on the combat training of the army turn into grave misfortunes and tragedies in war. This is where the price of big and small victories begins to rise.
Trouble came to the ranks of the Red Army long before the war. Since the mid-30s, its officer corps was decimated by repression. By 1940, the ground forces had lost about 48,773 people, the Air Force - 5,616 people and the Navy - over 3 thousand command personnel (TsAMO USSR. F. 32. Op. 65584. D. 11. L. 11, 12 ; F. 1. Op. 78426. D. 16. L. 24. GShVMF. F. 34. Op. 578. D. 2. L. 237). Arrested were many military commanders and the bulk of the leadership of the central departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense and military districts, as well as 27 corps commanders, 96 division commanders, 184 regiment commanders, 11 district and fleet air force commanders, 12 aviation division commanders, 4 fleet commanders and hundreds of other commanders and political workers. Their fate is known.
A personnel turnover began in the Red Army. During the period from 1938 to 1940, all military district commanders were replaced, their deputies, assistants, chiefs of staff, chiefs of military branches and services were updated by 90%, the leadership of corps departments and divisions was updated by 80%, and regiment commanders by 91%. , their assistants and regimental chiefs of staff. In most military districts, up to half of the officers had command experience from 6 months to 1 year, and about 30-40% of mid-level commanders were reserve officers with insufficient military training.
Pre-war attempts to overcome the personnel crisis did not produce the desired effect. Command staff in schools and academies were trained in conditions of an acute shortage of military teachers, on a weak educational and material base and under reduced programs. Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the current shortage of wartime personnel in the border and internal districts reached more than 36 thousand officers, and about 55 thousand reserve command personnel were missing to cover the mobilization needs of the troops.
But the soldiers’ troubles originate even deeper - in the times of the so-called “Frunzenskaya” military reform"1924-1928. Then, due to devastation and economic hopelessness, the Red Army was reduced from 5.5 million to 562 thousand people. Meanwhile, the annual number of conscripts in the country, without damage to the national economy and education, was at that time more than 900 thousand people , but due to the limited conscription capacity, the army and navy could only recruit about 300 thousand Red Army and Red Navy men. It turned out that every year up to 600 thousand people were left out of military training. By the summer of 1941, millions of people were not trained for military service. matter, made up a significant part of the conscripts.
For many commanders and soldiers, the first lessons of the merciless educational program of war became their last. It took a lot of blood to learn to fight.

ORDER TO UNITS OF THE 50TH RIFLE DIVISION

In parts of the division, there was an incorrect use of command personnel, such as: in the companies there were only one platoon of personnel left, and the command personnel participated in the battle of the entire company, which led to unnecessary losses of command personnel, the command personnel were not taken care of, as a result of which during the period of hostilities from August 16 With. A large percentage of the command staff dropped out.
Commanding personnel in division units are not used according to their specialty, as, for example, in the 359th [rifle] regiment there was a case when artillerymen were sent into battle with rifle companies.
Junior [command] and rank and file personnel who distinguished themselves in battles against German fascism are not promoted to positions of command staff.
In pursuance of order to the troops of the Western Front No. 057 of August 18, 1941, I ORDER:
1. In division units, when personnel fail, create full-blooded platoons, companies, and battalions. Command staff should not be sent into battle without personnel.
After staffing full-fledged units, all command personnel who do not have units are sent to the divisional reserve.
2. Stop the practice of using command personnel not in their specialty.
3. It is bolder to nominate junior commanders and Red Army soldiers who have distinguished themselves in battle to positions of command staff, regardless of whether there are regular vacant positions, without staff positions send to the divisional reserve.
For nominated junior commanders and Red Army soldiers to mid-command positions, submit personal lists in Form No. 3 of NKO Order No. 450 for approval by the division order in mid-command positions by September 2 of this year. G.
4. By September 2 this year. d. submit a draft order for the promotion of command personnel to higher positions:
platoon commanders to company commanders, etc.
5. Explain to the Red Army soldiers and ml. commanders that after they are approved by division order in mid-command positions, they are enrolled in all types of pay as mid-commands and [they] will be awarded the military rank of mid-commands.
Report execution on September 3.

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5864. D. 1. L. 400

FROM A POLITICAL REPORT OF THE 325TH RIFLE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY RESERVE OF THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND

<...>
The division's combat training was carried out according to an accelerated program from September 1 to October 29, 1941.

There were shortcomings in the learning process. Sometimes commanders teach what is not on the schedule, namely: regulation of marching steps, turns on the spot, and not what they will have to face in war.
Connection parts accelerated program were not completed completely, the quality of preparation is low. Needs improvement.
<...>The lack of training and combat weapons and ammunition does not allow us to study the material and does not make it possible to prepare personnel for combat.
The division has:
- training rifles - 143;
- hand grenades (training) - 35;
- machine guns (training) -3;
- light machine guns (training) - 2;
- small-caliber rifles-21.
There is nothing of communications and artillery equipment.
<...>Made with my own hands:
- hand grenades (blanks) - 7037;
- rifles (wooden) - 130;
- machine guns (wooden models) -7;
- tanks (models) - 5.
Personnel conduct classes using homemade wooden weapons.
There is no winter clothing. For this reason, only on November 10, 1941, 8 people deserted. A total of 82 people deserted. Found and brought to trial by the Military Tribunal - 16.
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5873. D. 11. L. 7.9

FROM A POLITICAL REPORT OF THE 1086th RIFLE REGIMENT OF THE 323rd RIFLE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT

To the head of the political department of the 323rd [rifle] division]

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 9. L. 47

FROM A REPORT OF THE 323rd RIFLE DIVISION OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT
ABOUT LOSSES IN OFFENSIVE COMBATS FROM DECEMBER 17 TO 19, 1941

[To the headquarters of the 323rd Infantry Division]

During the offensive from 17 to 19.12.41:

<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 9. L. 48

FROM A POLITICAL REPORT OF THE 10TH ARMY OF THE WESTERN FRONT

To the political department of the Western Front

<...>The largest number of crimes was noted in units of the 385th Rifle Division due to the fault of the division commander, who criminally led the troops entrusted to him, unable to organize combat operations not only with the formation as a whole, but also with individual units, due to which not a single combat order of the Military was carried out Army Council.
The division commander, Colonel Savin, and the military commissar Nesteruk did not organize a systematic reconnaissance of the enemy’s forces, the location of their fire weapons, a thorough study of the terrain and the routes of approach to the enemy’s location, and sometimes, without timely information about the enemy’s forces, they ordered blind attacks, from which the units suffered big losses.
Due to the lack of commander's will and Bolshevik persistence, high political consciousness, iron military discipline, contempt for death, offensive impulse, vigor and confidence in victory over the enemy were not introduced into the consciousness of the mass of soldiers and commanders.
Because of this, during combat operations, individual commanding officers and soldiers criminally did not follow orders, showed disorganization, confusion, cowardice and panic, threw down their weapons and fled from the battlefield.
For example:
The commander of the 2nd company of the 1st battalion 1268 from the [rifle] regiment, Borodin, fulfilling the combat order to capture the village. Loshikhino, together with other units of the regiment, burst into the outskirts of the village. At this time, the battalion commander was wounded and Borodin was ordered to take command of the battalion. Borodin did not carry out this order, did not lead the battalion, thanks to this, people deprived of leadership began to flee the village in panic. Due to the fact that the flanks of the battalion were not covered (which Borodin was obliged and had the opportunity to do), the battalion suffered heavy losses.
Borodin was sentenced to death by the Military Tribunal on the basis of NGO Order No. 270.
<...>A number of command personnel of the 385th Rifle Division have poor military training. For example, the head of the 1st department of the [operational] headquarters, Major Spiridonov.
In 1917, under Kerensky, he completed accelerated courses for warrant officers, then for some time he participated in the civil war in the ranks of the Red Army and was demobilized, was in the reserve and, recently working as an economist, was involved in training camps for command personnel 2-3 times.
In 1941, he was called up for mobilization and headed the 1st department of the headquarters (essentially the operational center of the division).
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 177. L. 173

EXTRACT FROM THE HISTORICAL FORMULAR OF THE 376TH RIFLE PSKOV RED BANNER DIVISION
DURING THE PERIOD OF FIGHTING ON THE RIVER. VOLKHOV FROM DECEMBER 30, 1941 TO JANUARY 1, 1942

<...>
The battle, organized on the night of December 30, 1941, did not have means of suppressing enemy defenses (mortars and artillery) and could have been designed for surprise and night cover. As a result, at the beginning of the battle we managed to reach the western bank of the river. Volkhov and overcome the forefield, come close to the main line of enemy defense.
The following days, senseless attacks continued without success, causing heavy losses to the division. Over the four days of the offensive, they made up 50 percent of the personnel.
The reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the division were the following:
<...>
3. Lack of intelligence information about the enemy when a division was rushed from the march directly into battle.
4. Ignorance of the enemy led to an incorrect assessment of the enemy and hence to an impossible assignment of tasks to units and subunits.
5. Our lack of mortars, artillery and aviation, which undermined the confidence of soldiers and commanders in our success.
<...>
7. The predominant number of commanders are called up from the reserves, with low military training. This greatly affected the military operations of the troops.
8. Poor training of staff officers, poorly organized headquarters and lack of communications equipment.
<...>
The division's losses from 12/29/41 to 1/24/42 amounted to 15,000 people. During this period, the division was withdrawn four times for replenishment and received a total of 12,000 reinforcements.
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 317. Op. 4306. D. 36. L. 41

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 20th ARMY

Active Army

Contents: About the organization of the battle
Observations and checks of the organization of battle by commanders of formations and units show that commanders of all levels organize battles poorly, sometimes limiting themselves only to issuing verbal orders. This can explain that for several days the army troops fought on previously reached lines, having little success on the right flank.
Before an offensive, commanders do not conduct reconnaissance and do not coordinate interaction on the ground with other branches of the military, as a result of which units and formations act blindly. The infantry does not know the tasks of the artillery, the artillery does not know where the infantry is operating. As a rule, infantry commanders (company and battalion commanders) do not submit requests for artillery. Military sappers are not used for reconnaissance of the front line.
The command posts of division commanders and battalion commanders are not combined, and assault and blocking groups are not created.
During the battle, commanders of units and formations do not sufficiently study the situation, therefore, as a rule, they do not know what is happening on the battlefield. As a result, company and battery commanders are left to their own devices.

I ORDER: 1. When organizing an offensive, commanders of formations and units must conduct personal commander reconnaissance, determining the objectives of the offensive on the ground. On the ground, establish interaction with artillery and tanks according to time and boundaries.
2. Create assault and blocking groups, assign them specific tasks to capture populated areas.
3. Do not scatter your forces and resources on a wide front, but strive to hit the enemy on a narrow front with the entire mass of artillery fire, mortars and manpower. Try to bypass the enemy's fortified settlements - under no circumstances hit him head-on, but hit him where he does not expect.
4. Have artillery Observation Points of divisions directly at the Command Points of battalion commanders with the expectation of fulfilling the latter’s requests for fire impact on the enemy.
5. Bring division and brigade headquarters as close to the troops as possible (3-4 km).
6. Commanders of all levels continuously monitor the situation in battle and, if necessary, respond to it immediately, using, if necessary, the fire reserve and manpower allocated for this.

TsAMO USSR. F. 373. Op. 6631. D. 19. L. 2,3

FROM THE GERMAN ARMY BULLETIN

Experience of the war in the East General provisions.
The Bolsheviks are the most stubborn and treacherous of all the opponents we had to face in this war. As a rule, they fight not for any ideal, not for their homeland, but out of fear of the boss, especially the commissar.
Russian attacks, as a rule, take place according to this pattern once and for all - in large masses of men and are repeated several times without any changes. The advancing infantry leaves their infantry positions in compact groups and rushes into the attack from a great distance shouting “Hurray.” Officers and commissars follow behind and shoot at those lagging behind.
In most cases, an attack is preceded by reconnaissance in force on a wide front, which, after breaking through the enemy’s [defenses] or infiltrating into our location, turns into a decisive attack from the rear and flanks.
Artillery preparation for an attack is rarely used, but they are very willing to use short but strong harassing fire from long distances at night, before an attack, constantly changing their firing positions.
The Russians begin their attacks at dusk or dawn. Taking advantage of darkness, fog, blizzard or rainy weather, the Russians occupy their starting positions for attack. The repulsed attacks are repeated again, sparing no effort and changing nothing. It is difficult to imagine that during one combat day of the offensive the [attacking] unit will in any way change the attack pattern.
Thus, to repel Russian attacks, we need strong nerves and the knowledge that our excellent small arms are able to withstand a massive Russian offensive.
Artillery and heavy infantry weapons have the task of pinning down the support of the [Russian] attack by conducting massive fire on the discovered starting positions. Since they are most often located in hollows, the fire of grenade launchers, which the Russians are especially afraid of, has a great effect. Infantry suppresses close-range attacks with automatic weapons.
The morale impact of the Russians' shouts of "Hurray" can be weakened by their own shouts of "Hurray", which gives the Russians the impression that the Germans themselves are going on the attack. It is not recommended to organize local spontaneous counterattacks in the presence of weak forces. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Russians cannot withstand systematically carried out counterattacks, especially from the flanks.
<...>Carrying out constantly harassing attacks with small forces has the goal of exhausting enemy units and repelling his attack even before he launches an attack with the main forces.
Reflecting enemy reconnaissance actions should be carried out in a variety of ways, since in the case of monotonous repetition of the organization of defense, the enemy’s reconnaissance activities are facilitated. It is advisable to begin repelling [the attack] a small amount weapons in order to prevent the enemy from organizing an attack from the very beginning.
<...>

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 107. L. 262. Translation from a German captured document

WAR COUNCIL DIRECTIVE FOR THE WESTERN FRONT

№ 3750

To all commanders, commissars of divisions and brigades

The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the Military Council of the Front receive numerous letters from Red Army soldiers, commanders and political workers, testifying to the criminally negligent attitude of command at all levels towards saving the lives of Red Army infantry soldiers.
Letters and stories give hundreds of examples where commanders of units and formations kill hundreds and thousands of people during attacks on undestroyed enemy defenses and undestroyed machine guns, on unsuppressed strong points, during a poorly prepared offensive.
These complaints are certainly fair and reflect only part of the current frivolous attitude towards saving replenishment<...>.
I demand:
1. Thoroughly investigate every abnormal loss of people within 24 hours and, based on the results of the investigation, immediately make a decision, reporting to the highest headquarters. Commanders who criminally threw units into an unsuppressed enemy fire system should be brought to the strictest responsibility and appointed to a lower position.
2. Before an infantry attack, the enemy’s fire system must be suppressed and neutralized, for which each commander organizing an attack must have a carefully developed plan for destroying the enemy by fire and attack. Such a plan must be approved by the senior commander, which at the same time should serve as control for the senior commander.
3. Attach to reports on losses a personal explanation of the substance of the losses, who is responsible for abnormal losses, what measures have been taken against those responsible and to prevent them [losses] in the future.

TsAMO USSR. F. 353. Op. 5879. D. 174. L. 390

19.09.1907 - 22.06.1968
Hero of the Soviet Union

M Atveev Ivan Stepanovich - commander of the 1086th Red Banner Rifle Regiment (323rd Bryansk Red Banner Rifle Division, 33rd Army, 1st Belorussian Front),
lieutenant colonel.
Born on September 19, 1907 in the village of Yegoryevo, now Laishevsky district of the Republic of Tatarstan, into a peasant family. Russian. He graduated from 8 classes, then in 1927 from a Soviet party school in the city of Chistopol. He worked as chairman of the Yegoryevsky village council. In 1929 he was chairman of the first agricultural commune in the region named after Karl Marx.
Drafted into the army in 1929. Member of the CPSU(b)/CPSU since 1930. Graduated from the school of political instructors. He served as a company Komsomol organizer, deputy company commander for political affairs, and after 1937 - party organizer, battalion commissar. By 1941, he was a 2nd year student at the Military-Political Academy.
During the Great Patriotic War in the active army - from June 1941. Fought on Western Front. He was shell-shocked on October 5, 1942. In 1943, he graduated from the Higher Tactical Rifle Course for command personnel “Vystrel”, where he was retrained for a combat position.
Major I.S. Matveev was sent to the front, where he received the 1086th Infantry Regiment of the 323rd Infantry Division. In this division he fought on the Bryansk, Belorussian, 1st Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, and again the 1st Belorussian fronts.
He particularly distinguished himself during the Vistula-Oder strategic operation on Polish territory.
During the advance of the 33rd Army from the Pulawy bridgehead on the Vistula in the battles in the area of the settlements of Gnezdkow, Nemirichuv (15 km southeast of the city of Zvolen) on January 14 - 17, 1945, he skillfully organized a breakthrough of three lines of the enemy’s heavily fortified long-term defense to its entire depth. At the same time, his regiment inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and equipment and captured large trophies.
U Kazakh Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 27, 1945 for skillful command of the regiment, courage and heroism shown in the Vistula-Oder operation, Matveev Ivan Stepanovich awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.
After the end of the war he continued to serve in the Armed Forces. In 1946, he graduated from the Shot course for the second time, and in 1952, in absentia from the M.V. Frunze Military Academy. Since 1955, Colonel I.S. Matveev has been in reserve. Lived in Kharkov, worked in an automation experimental design bureau.
Awarded 3 Orders of Lenin (27.02.1945; 24.03.1945; ...), 2 Orders of the Red Banner (7.03.1944; ...), Orders of Alexander Nevsky (3.10.1943), Order of the Patriotic War 2nd degree (29.12.1944), Order of the Red Banner Stars, medals.

On the Bryansk Front, Major I.S. Matveev participated as part of the 11th Army in the Oryol offensive operation (July 12 - August 18, 1943) - final stage Battle of Kursk, including the liberation of the city of Karachev; then in the Bryansk offensive operation (September 1 - October 3, 1943), including the liberation of the city of Bryansk.
During the fighting in July 1943, commanding the regiment, he completed all combat missions assigned to the regiment. With small losses, he captured the settlements of Resseta, Mokrye Dvory and others (Khvastovichi district of the Kaluga region).
He repelled counterattacks of superior enemy forces with heavy losses near the village of Kolodyassy, Khvastovichi district. During the offensive, he skillfully maneuvered on the battlefield and established interaction with other branches of the military. He occupied the settlements of Terebilovo, Krasny Pakhar, Pesochnaya, and participated in the capture of the city of Karachev.
The regiment of Major I.S. Matveev, under heavy fire from the retreating enemy, pursued him, inflicting losses on him and pushing him to the west.
On the night of September 16-17, 1943, the 1086th Regiment crossed the Desna River with a swift attack and, together with other units of the division, broke into the northern part of the city of Bryansk.
For distinguishing himself in these battles, I.S. Matveev was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky.
On the Belorussian Front, as part of the 11th Army, he participated in the Gomel-Rechitsa offensive operation (November 10 - 30, 1943) to defeat the Gomel-Rechitsa enemy group on the territory of the Gomel region (Belarus).
On the 1st Belorussian Front, as part of the 3rd Army, he participated in the Rogachev-Zhlobin offensive operation (February 21 - 26, 1944) and subsequent battles in the Bobruisk direction.
The 1086th Rifle Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel I.S. Matveev, after a 6-day march on March 1, 1944, entered the battle and, under strong enemy artillery and mortar fire, broke through its defenses in the direction of Gorokhov, Yurkov, Bushmarenkovo. In the regiment's sector the enemy was pushed back. The regiment, together with other units of the 323rd and 129th Infantry Divisions (40th Corps of the 3rd Army), crossed the Drut River on the ice northwest of the city of Rogachev and captured a bridgehead near the village of Bolshiye Konoplitsy (now Konoplitsy) in the Rogachevsky district of the Gomel region south of the village of Ozerany. On March 2 and 3, the enemy launched counterattacks with up to an infantry regiment supported by 30 tanks and artillery. All of them were repulsed with heavy losses for the enemy. He lost more than 200 soldiers and officers killed, 3 tanks were burned, 5 tanks were knocked out, 6 prisoners were taken.
I.S. Matveev was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
The regiment of Lieutenant Colonel I.S. Matveev was on the bridgehead near the Drut River until June 1944.
As part of the 3rd Army, I.S. Matveev participated in the Belarusian strategic operation “Bagration” - Bobruisk (June 24 - 29, 1944) and Minsk (June 29 - July 4, 1944) offensive operations on the 1st Belorussian Front; Bialystok offensive operation (July 5 - 27, 1944) on the 2nd Belorussian Front.
During the Bobruisk operation, operating from a bridgehead on the Drut River, Lieutenant Colonel Matveev skillfully led the regiment. Being at a forward observation post, he organized the interaction of subunits and attached units, thanks to which the deeply layered defense was broken through. This made it possible to expand the bridgehead and build on the success achieved.
The regiment, led by I.S. Matveev, liberated dozens of settlements in Belarus in 4 days of fighting and advanced 50 kilometers in battles, pursuing and destroying enemy personnel and equipment. During this time, he destroyed up to 1,150 soldiers and officers, took 35 prisoners, 15 guns, 10 tractors, 28 mortars, 2 tanks, 8 vehicles, 6 heavy and 28 light machine guns and other enemy military property.
I.S. Matveev was awarded the Order of Lenin.
During the Bialystok operation, the 1086th Infantry Regiment entered Polish territory and fought stubborn battles in swampy and forested areas on the outskirts of the city of Bialystok, cutting off the Sokolka-Bialystok highway.
The regiment's battalion was the first to cross the Narew River in the area of the village of Bokiny and won a bridgehead, giving the regiment and division the opportunity to develop a further offensive.
Throughout the summer offensive, the regiment carried out important combat missions, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. They captured more than 1,500 prisoners, a large amount of weapons and military equipment.
I.S. Maslov was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 2nd degree.
At the final stage of the war, I.S. Matveev again on the 1st Belorussian Front as part of the 33rd Army took part in the Warsaw-Poznan offensive operation (January 14 - February 3, 1945 - an integral part of the Vistula-Oder strategic operation); then in the Berlin Strategic Offensive Operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945).
From award sheet to be awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union
The commander of the 1086th Red Banner Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Matveev, in combat operations from January 14 to 18, 1945, proved himself to be an experienced, combative, courageous and courageous commander, fearlessly and skillfully leading his regiment from one victory to another.
On January 14, 1945, Lieutenant Colonel Matveev, to the sounds of an orchestra, with an unfurled banner, raised the regiment to attack and, on a bridgehead in the Gnezdkow area, with a swift blow broke through the long-term enemy defenses and in an hour and a half, having passed through 4 lines of trenches, overcame all artificial obstacles and captured the enemy’s first position.
Without allowing the enemy to come to his senses, on his shoulders the 1086th Infantry Regiment, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Matveev, broke through the enemy’s second fortified position, captured his artillery positions and, without stopping, went into pursuit and immediately broke through the enemy’s third position in the Nemirichuv region.